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Teece's Competing Through Innovation 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
 
DAVID J. TEECE, COMPETING THROUGH INNOVATION:TECHNOLOGICAL STRATEGIES AND ANTITRUST 
POLICIES.  Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar (2013) (484 + xxxi pp.) 
 This book collects the scholarly articles written by David Teece and some 
co-authors over a period of roughly two decades, although most are since 2000.  
The topics relate to innovation and competition policy and the range is broad, 
including market definition, the relationship between antitrust policy and 
intellectual property rights, and application of antitrust principles to innovation 
intensive markets.  The articles are reproduced in full, with all notes and figures 
intact, and even the original headings and pagination for the reader’s 
convenience.  The book's fundamental theme, as expressed in the introduction, is 
that competition through innovation is fundamentally a different thing than price 
and output competition.  As a result, traditional price theory and industrial 
organization often serves us poorly.  The sentiments are more than vaguely 
Schumpeterian. 
 One principle that pervades Teece’s work is that innovation must be 
facilitated by means of sufficient private rewards, and in our current system the 
rewards are too low.  This is true largely because legal regimes such as antitrust 
engage in excessive ex post restriction on the deployment of innovation, 
particularly on the use of intellectual property rights, and even more particularly, 
patents.   Teese gives as one example an expansive doctrine of patent “misuse,” 
which historically condemned patent practices that had competitively harmless 
explanations, such as tying or royalties on total sales. These practices could not 
realistically serve to expand the patentee’s market power.  The ordinary remedy 
in “misuse” cases, which is that the patent becomes unenforceable until the 
misuse is terminated, decouples legal doctrine from facilitation of innovation by 
limiting the value of patents in situations where no harm is done to the 
infringement defendant or, typically, anyone else.  Today, of course, successful 
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misuse claims are a rarity, as is condemnation of royalties on total sales.  The one 
relic that remains and needs to be overturned is continued application of the 
Brulotte rule disallowing agreements that require royalty or royalty-like payments 
after a patent's expiration.  Even there, running foul of Brulotte is usually a result 
of careless drafting of license agreements, and should not often hinder 
innovation. 
 Another theme that Teece and co-authors develop is that antitrust law’s 
traditional tools for measuring market power often go awry when we are talking 
about high technology markets.  This is so for a number of reasons: high fixed 
costs, the relation between high margins and incentives, and thus the reduced 
significance of high margins in situations of rapid technological turnover.  Also 
important are network effects, which often serve to make a single platform more 
efficient than multiple competing platforms, but the single platform is then 
associated with the evils of monopoly.  Additionally, policy makers assessing 
market power often fail to distinguish between monopoly returns and what Teece 
terms “Schumpeterian rents,” which are the short run returns necessary to 
facilitate technological turnover.  Quite aside from the phenomenon of high fixed 
costs, the highly innovative firm requires a constant stream of revenue above cost 
in order to permit continued research and development. 
By the same token, Teece believes that the threat of “monopolistic” 
conduct in such markets – meaning that the dominant firm locks in its own 
technology, excludes rival technologies, and uses its dominance to suppress 
output – is relatively unlikely because technology is so difficult to control. 
In an interesting piece on innovation in the context of networks and 
multiple innovators, co-authored with Deepak Somaya and Simon Wakeman, 
Teece explores the implications of individual firm decisions whether to invent for 
themselves or purchase their innovations from others.  In markets characterized 
by multiple competing innovators, each of which may have advantages in its own 
domain, the result will be a great deal of cross-licensing.  As Teece also suggests, 
this is really little more than a corollary of Coase’s article on The Nature of the 
Firm.  If one firm has internal production and development advantages in 
hardware while another firm has it in software, the firm who needs both in order 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2368567 
Hovenkamp Book Review Dec. 2013, Page 3 
 Teece, Competing Through Innovation 
 
 
to market its product will produce in the market where it has a comparative 
advantage, and license from others in markets where it has a comparative 
disadvantage.  The result will be cross licensing.  Multiply this out over markets 
that have numerous innovators or inputs and the resulting phenomenon is 
widespread cross licensing and its common network companion: standard setting.  
The story is more complex, they note, in markets that have clear leaders.  If one 
firm is far out in front of the others it may be advantageous for it to produce 
more internally and license less.  If it looks inward too much, however, outside 
firms will catch up and even surpass it.  The leader may then find itself 
technologically isolated.  They give as an example Research in Motion, which 
developed the Blackberry as a result of its own technological breakthroughs in 
mobile email technology.  The eventual result of going it alone excessively was 
that rival smartphone technologies caught up and surpassed the Blackberry. 
On the patent system, Teese’s work generally displays a level of optimism 
that puts him in the minority among academics today, although his views may be 
more in accord with many judges on the United States Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  He believes that the value of the patent system in promoting innovation 
has generally been underappreciated, while its potential harms and shortcomings 
have been exaggerated.  The literature on narrow patenting and patent thickets is 
one good example.  Teece and his co-authors acknowledge the problems posed 
by large scale patenting, overly narrow and ambiguous patents, anticommons 
problems, and royalty stacking.  However, they believe that the literature 
discussing these problems has not been sensitive to the offsetting problem of 
supporting innovation in markets where inventions come from multiple 
innovators and patents serve to commoditize innovations in markets that are 
subject to numerous “make or buy” decisions regarding innovation.  In such 
markets firms produce, purchase, or sell their innovations, permitting each 
participant to optimize over their own capabilities, and the patent system serves 
the important purpose of creating tradable units of innovation. 
That argument may prove too much, however.  If firms in a multi-innovator 
market really wished to facilitate internal innovation where it is cost-jusitified, 
and exchange where it is not, they would have a strong interest in articulating the 
exchangeable units in such a way that property rights were clearly defined, 
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ownership was unambiguous, and trading was confined to issues of price and 
technological suitability.  In fact, however, that would be a much different 
situation than the one we actually have.  Particularly in information technologies, 
patents are ambiguously drafted in ways that are calculated to exaggerate the 
inventor’s achievements.  Patents are so numerous in some markets, and 
searching and interpreting them is so costly that the transaction costs of 
exchange often induce firms to develop without licensing.  Indeed, the rights may 
be so poorly defined that the “make or buy” decision is itself highly ambiguous, 
with many firms operating under the impression that they are “making,” quite 
innocently, when others believe that they should be buying because their 
internally developed technology is later found to infringe on the technology of 
others. 
Or to put it more bluntly, a well functioning system of tradable innovation 
rights would require far lower information and related transaction costs than the 
system that we actually have.  To be sure, the patent itself is certainly a useful 
“certificate” describing a unit of innovation.  One problem with maintain 
innovation as trade secrets is that, while trade secrets may be effective ways of 
protecting one’s internal innovations from appropriation by others, trade secrets 
themselves are often too inchoate as certificates of innovation to be readily 
tradable.  Patents can be readily assigned; they can be licensed, both exclusively 
and nonexclusively.  Aggregation of large numbers of them present few problems 
when they are treated as personal property for purposes of exchange.  Everything 
they stand for is described on a typically small document.  Where the patent 
system fails us, however, especially in information technologies, is that too often 
these certificates are worthless because what they describe is not really a 
worthwhile innovation, because interpreting them is very costly, as is determining 
whether they are worth purchasing.  Recent decisions placing a value on FRAND-
encumbered patents suggest a ratio between patentee’s claimed value and 
judicially determined value exceeding 2000-to-1.  This is very far from a well 
functioning market. 
This may be mainly a collective action problem.  As a group, the 
manufacturers of cellphones might profit from a much smaller number of clearer 
patents, providing little dispute about who owns what and who needs what, and 
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thus facilitating exchange.  In such a setting make or buy decisions would be 
optimal and firms could have some confidence that they were choosing the value 
maximizing course.  Individually, however, developers of technology have a strong 
incentive to overstate and create ambiguity which may serve to enlarge the value 
of what they have down the road.  Here, the unfortunate reality may be that our 
patent system, with its relentless focus on individual appropriation, may be 
serving us poorly by undermining rather than facilitating efficient make or buy 
decision making. 
Teece (along with Thomas M. Jorde and J. Gregory Sidak) also argue that 
mandatory unbundling in telecommunications, which requires incumbent 
telephone carriers to make their elements available to rivals at administered 
prices, would have adverse consequences in both the incumbent and the 
competitive markets.  On the incumbent side, mandatory unbundling would 
diminish the incentive to innovate by reducing the returns to each incumbent’s 
element to prices normally associated with public utility regulation.   On the 
competitive side, the ability to interconnect freely would reduce the incentive of 
competitive exchange carriers to develop these elements for themselves.  Why 
should they, when they are effectively entitled to connect into the incumbent’s 
technology at below market level prices?  The result is to slow innovation at both 
ends. 
This collection of articles is provocative, often controversial, and well worth 
reading.  They provide a great deal to think about, even for the reader who 
ultimately may not agree with everything. 
